Books : Dangerous Nation: America's Foreign Policy from Its Earliest Days to the Dawn of the Twentieth Century (Vintage)
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Type of bind: Paperback
Dewey Decimal Number: 973
EAN num: 9780375724916
ISBN number: 0375724915
Label: Vintage
Manufacturer: Vintage
Quantity: 1
Page Count: 544
Printing Date: November 06, 2007
Publishing house: Vintage
Release Date: November 06, 2007
Sale Popularity Level: 49437
Studio: Vintage
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Most Americans believe the United States had been an isolationist power until the twentieth century. This is wrong. In a riveting and brilliantly revisionist work of history, Robert Kagan, bestselling author of Of Paradise and Power, shows how Americans have in fact steadily been increasing their global power and influence from the beginning. Driven by commercial, territorial, and idealistic ambitions, the United States has always perceived itself, and been seen by other nations, as an international force. This is a book of great importance to our understanding of our nation’s history and its role in the global community.
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Rated by buyers 
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What we really need in this and future administrations is a Secretary of History so that we can recognize what has been done right and wrong in the past and avoid the wrongs and repeats the rights in the future, exactly what we don't do.
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In Dangerous Nation, Washington Post columnist and former U.S. state department employee Robert Kagan makes a compelling case for a new way to interpret the history of U.S. foreign relations. Most scholars contest that America's foreign policy up until the early twentieth century might best be described as "isolationist" in nature; a potential global power which only unleashed its global influence when threatened by two world wars and a fifty year Cold War. Kagan, conversely, argues that the United States pushed forth a foreign policy of expansion and global influence from its inception. As the book's title suggests, other nations recognized this incipient tendency in U.S. foreign policy, especially European absolutists. In a growing era of modernity and liberal democracy, monarchists were wary of both American global potential and the ideals for which they stood.
Kagan's interpretation of the past seems to hinge on his own experiences of the present. For example, on page 158, Kagan's contention that in the early 19th century's era of European revolutions, "the United States was unavoidably a protagonist in this Cold War-style global confrontation" reveals an interpretation of the past fixed solely in a modern mindset. This statement seems less surprising considering Kagan's former role in the U.S. State Department during the Reagan administration. Superimposing a Cold War framework onto a conflict revolving around monarchies, not to mention completely devoid of nuclear weapons, is bad enough. Realizing that Cold War frameworks, at least to many policy experts, are no longer relevant in today's terrorist-focused foreign policy, makes even Kagan's "modern" framework seem dated. In other words, basing one's interpretation of the past is one thing; basing it on a neo-con's experiences of the 1980s seems a little, well, one sided.
Kagan's nuanced summary of slavery's role in shaping early nineteenth century is more likely to win applauds from modern diplomatic historians. In his seventh chapter "The Foreign Policy of Slavery," Kagan takes the most pressing domestic issue of America's very first seventy years and shows out it affected the outlook of foreign policy makers. Revolutionaries turned statesmen of no lesser stature that George Washington and Thomas Jefferson were quite wary of the slave uprising in Haiti--an event wholly under-appreciated by American historians--and according to Kagan (on page 185), this even produced "an acute national vulnerability that was recognized in both the North and the South." The latter of these groups were, for obvious reasons, more concerned with grey uprisings, especially those in close proximities of Spanish settlements. This threat, Kagan convincingly argues, helped to influence the aggressive foreign policy of early American statesmen.
Some theoretical background would add much to Kagan's easily accessible summary of U.S. Foreign Relations. For example, he is astute to point out that George Washington's now famous warning against engaging in European "entangling alliances" simply implied staying out of the realm of European military enterprises; Washington was more concerned with westward expansion, especially the Ohio territory. Indian removal in the west prompted a whole new realm of land-based foreign policy that sea-led European Empire did not have to deal with regularly. Kagan would have been better served by noting the classics in U.S. foreign policy to actually flesh out this observation. For example, what would Frederick Jackson Turner's (now admittedly antiquated) analysis say about this early westward myopic tendency? Or, conversely, what might a borderlands methodology contribute to Kagan's overview? These criticisms are not meant to simply point out what Dangerous Nation should have addressed for criticism's sake; instead, they show an under-appreciation of foreign relation's historiography.
Race relations played a key role domestically, and Kagan hints at its influence on determining the ideas of policymakers. For example, he points out Alexander Hamilton's flirtation with the idea of freeing Venezuela from Spanish rule--a lofty goal for the young statesman. Yet, Hamilton felt confident of sucess in any such endeavor, either on the western border or overseas, due to a supposed "natural order" of things. Kagan chalks this up to a liberal-enlightenment worldview, supposedly one best characterized by the influence of Adam Smith's invisible hand (an idea that permeated America's entire worldview in the late 18th and early 19th century, not just its economics). But could racism have had more influence on Hamilton's view of the Spanish instead of his seemingly natural gift for cockiness? Put another way, Hamilton, along with John Adams, supported the abolition of slavery even before the revolution. Yet, how stratified were these men's racial ideas, and to what degree did they influence foreign policy ideas? Kagan ... Read More
Rated by buyers 
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Robert Kagan challenges the perception, that a country's foreign policy shall be based on its economic interests only. This book is a very solid effort to prove, that the US foreign policy in the 19th century was a fusion of economic interests and the reasons like morality, humanitarianism and national liberation. What Kagan basically says, is that the most of the 19th century American politicians were not used to think along the lines of "a pragmatic foreign policy" - the term, which has been so much in use these days, and particularly in Europe. Obviously, besides economic calculations, the US policymakers at that time had also their ideological calculations.
The author does not rebuff the allegations, that the desire for personal profit had played a role in every acquisition of new American territory. But he adds, that American expansionism was possible very first and foremost by attraction, based on a superior political and economic system and only then by force of arms. "American global influence need not depend on the perpetual mlitary subjugation of overseas colonies. While the use of force might sometimes be necessary to gain American traiders equal acess to foreign markets, America's real and lasting influence would come through the power of trade itself".
At the end of the 19th century the United States declares war on Spain, however. A signifcant reason for that, was awareness that the continuation of the Cuban Civil war included the total destruction of American property and investments. But as the author puts it, although those were important considerations, for President McKinley they were secondary to the humanitarian crisis. Robert Kagan mentions that some historians are insisting that the humanitarian concerns in this case were just a cover for selfish economic interests, while most American historians had been baffled that the United States had gone to war for abstract reasons.
Interesting enough, to read the whole book, was to find out that President Grant, in his second inaugural address, expressed his conviction that "our great Maker is preparing the world, in His own good time, to become one nation, speaking one language". The author adds to that, that most of Americans at that time believed, that all nations are treading the same path to become civilized; some faster, some slower. Today, this acknowledgement appears to have outlived glory days; it is modern to discuss cultural diversity. The question, therefore, is whether American world expansion in the 21st century is as inevitable as the expansion in the Western hemisphere during the 18th and 19th centuries? Perhaps Robert Kagan will tell us about that in his subsequent book.
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Reviewed by Muhammed Hassanali
Kagan's main thesis is that America has always actively participated in state affairs beyond its borders. He does this through extensive historical analysis, and in the process, debunks the view that America has largely followed an isolationist foreign policy. Kagan's intent is clearly stated in the opening pages as: "This book is an endeavor to tell a different story that is more about expansion and ambition, idealistic as well as materialistic, than about isolationist exemplars and cities upon hills [6]."
Kagan presents the Massachusetts Bay Colonist as considering themselves part of England and interprets their vision as exporting their brand of religious expression back to the home country. He portrays the American revolutionaries as imperialists who took up arms to forge their own empire. Once liberated, the revolutionaries articulated ideals of individual freedoms and unfettered mercantilism that resulted in a policy that was more expansionist than those of the European powers. Kagan contends that this has been the genesis of American policy - at home and abroad.
The author continues that material pursuits are only part of the story. America was founded on the universal principles of democracy and liberty. These then defined the American character and were projected towards all with a degree of moral righteousness. After the Civil War, America's engagement in Venezuela and Samoa, along with its readiness to go to war against Spain (in 1898), further demonstrates American's imperial character. Here is where the book ends. He talks about continuing his analysis into contemporary times, but readers would have to wait for a second volume.
Kagan argues that Americas have always been aggressive, not only in their acquisition of land, but also in their quest to mold the world in their image. While this view is not widely held, he supports his thesis through internal sources shaping American attitudes and policies. As with any historical analysis, determining the relevant facts, and interpreting them is where divergent views arise.
Dangerous Nation is instructive in that it gives us an alternative view of history, thus inviting us to re-examine our past, discuss its ramifications and formulate our own historical interpretations.
Armchair Interview says: This author's thesis about America is different from conventional wisdom.
Rated by buyers -
I recently purchased this book and have started reading it after hearing parts of a radio interview with the author. I have not finished reading it yet, but the portion I have finished I was not overly impressed with. I'm no liberal by any stretch of the imagination, but this book seems to be such a naked apologetic for Neo-Conservatism that it is hard to to take the author seriously.
Although he quotes Perry Miller on Page 8, his treatment of the Puritans in the rest of the chapter seems to be diametrically opposed to Miller's observations and to that his most famous student Heimert, both of whom paint them in a far more generous light.
His comments on the political and practical philosophy of the founding fathers is new to me and somewhat interesting, possibly there will be some pearls waiting for those who decide to stick it out. I'm not sure I will end up being one of their number.
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