from: Cambridge University Press
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Type of bind: Paperback
Dewey Decimal Number: 355.0209041
EAN num: 9780521637602
ISBN number: 0521637600
Label: Cambridge University Press
Manufacturer: Cambridge University Press
Quantity: 1
Page Count: 428
Printing Date: August 13, 1998
Publishing house: Cambridge University Press
Sale Popularity Level: 248484
Studio: Cambridge University Press
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Product Description:
This study of major military innovations in the 1920s and 1930s explores differences in innovating exploitation by the seven major military powers. This volume of comparative essays investigates how and why innovation occurred or did not occur, and explains much of the strategic and operative performance of the Axis and Allies in World War II.
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Rated by buyers 
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Perhaps the most important insight this book offers is that military innovation is considerably more complex than simply building better mouse traps. The authors clearly demonstrate that the research, development, testing and evaluation (RDTE) process needed to create a new or improved military system is only the very first step in a complex process. For such a military system to be effective, there must be corresponding changes in the tactical and strategic doctrines, training, and organizational structures that reflect the capabilities and limitations of the new system.
The history of military innovation in the twenty year period between WWI and WWII then is a complicated one filled with successes, failures, missed opportunities and brilliant theorizing. To begin with few soldiers really believed that WWI was a "war to end all wars" as did some of the more idealistic politicians of the time. They therefore begin a scramble to understand the lessons and innovations that were the result of that war. Within the ground forces serious efforts were made to understand the implications of mechanization, especially armored fighting vehicles (AFV) and motor transport, for a future war. In a similar manner the air forces struggled to understand the demonstrated capabilities of the airplane for close ground support, air superiority, and most importantly strategic bombing. The navies of the world had to struggle with the role of submarines in future wars as well as the challenges and opportunities of naval aviation as represented by aircraft carriers, float planes and the need for long range reconnaissance. All services were deeply affected as well by the clear utility of wireless radio and soon other electronic breakthroughs.
Perhaps the most interesting chapter of the book is titled , "Assault from the Sea" which really concerns the efforts by the U.S., Japan, and to a lesser extent the UK to develop the doctrines, technology, and organizational structure to conduct large scale amphibious warfare. In this case the examples from WWI served only as the starting points for some very original work. And it was the U.S. Marine Corp that took the lead in this work, in spite of severe fiscal restraints.
In spite of some weak spots this book provides valuable information on the thinking of the military and civilian visonaries of the principal participants of WWII as they attempted to build modern military forces.
Rated by buyers 
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Readers should know what this book is and is not, before investing their time in this title. This work offers a serious examination of what the various military services prepared for World War II in the interwar period. How serious? It is on the required reading list at several military schools in the professional military education system and is also on the U.S. Army Chief of Staff's recommended reading list. Why? Well, it basically shows what factors can get in the way of military innovation. Despite what the general public might think, the applications of new technologies are not inherently obvious. Weapons systems do not come with instruction books. Armed services have to figure out how to configure and use new technologies that works best for them and the decision that one service comes up with might be very different from that of one of their pending allies and/or enemies.
Each chapter in this book is a separate case study from a different author. The topics covered include the development of aircraft carriers, submarines, torpedoes, mechanized combined armed warfare, radar, amphibious landing craft, and different ideas for strategic bombing campaigns. The successes and failures of the various players in these accounts are issues that contemporary leaders in defense matters need to keep in mind as they deal the ever-present and rapid pace of technological change. This is a book for military professionals and historical specialists. The lay reader can read these chapters with profit, but more will probably want to skip it for more general accounts.
Rated by buyers -
If you even have a modest interest in military history or in how the interpretation (or misinterpretation) of history can and in fact was used to shape the outcome of a major global event (WWII) then you will find this book very interesting.
Rated by buyers 
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The book does provide detailed footnotes as it is a series of essays where the writer of each "chapter" presents their viewpoint and analysis. However, this book provides no tables or charts to support any of the analysis or discussions presented. It would have been very helpful if there were a table or chart comparing each nation's "innovation" in each category described in this book, examples: armored warfare, strategic bombing, carrier development, etc.
What is most lacking in this book it that it focuses primarily on the US, Britain, and Germany, limited on Japan (amphibious assault and aircraft carrier development but nothing on their armour and combined arms tactics) and nothing significant on France, Italy, and Russia, who are mentioned merely in passing. This is the most glaring weakness of this book. Russia developed the T-34 tank, had a sizeable navy, large industrial base, naval infantry, paratroopers, cavalry, and actually trained with the Germans in the 1930's. The Italians were on the winning side of World War One, developed a large navy, their own tanks, and an ambitious goal to dominate the Mediterranean Sea, but they too are not mentioned.
It is important to learn how each of these major combatant nations developed as each had their own policies that led to successes and failures. An example is in amphibious landings, where the writer presents a view that the US was the most developed in the world during the interwar period. If that is the case, then why didn't the US endeavor an amphibious assault prior to 1943 and why were the casualties so high in the very first assault experienced at Tarawa? If the US was amphibious warfare strategy and doctrine was the most developed, then why did the British conduct the disastrous raid on Dieppe in 1943 as a rehearsal, wouldn't the US have enough experience in northern Africa, Sicily, and Anzio in 1943? The writer's claim is not supported through citing successful battles or numbers of equipment produced.
Another question is why weren't the British, Germans, Italians, and Russians mentioned or compared to in amphibious warfare? If Italy wanted to control the Med, wouldn't they have developed some type of doctrine or equipment? The Germans thought about invading England, what kind of equipment did they have and how would they have executed the invasion? The Russian Naval Infantry, what was their doctrine? The Japanese amphibious landing is well researched and presented, but again, no tables or charts are presented to summarize the writer's viewpoint.
Russia's development during the interwar period is very critical as the equipment developed during the period was superior or at least equal to the German equipment. The T-34 tank's only weakness in 1941 was the lack of radio equipment along with the doctrine of dispersing the tanks instead of massing them into large formations. If one reads other WW2 history books, one learns that the Germans were only able to defeat the T-34 tank in 1941 with better unit maneuver and with greater numbers. German anti-tank weapons had no effect with the German tanks undergunned and under ranged. The largest caliber on a German tank in 1941 being the short barreled 75mm mounted on the Panzer MK IV and the StugIII (which was an assault gun found in anti-tank battalions).
Another glaring omission in this book is there are no discussions on anti-weapons or counter munitions designed to defeat the innovations being developed in the interwar period, the lone exception being the torpedo and US artillery proximity fuses. There are no discussions on the bazooka, anti-tank rifles, anti-tank guns, shaped charges, depth charges, or anti-aircraft guns. Obviously the Germans had planned for anti-aircraft defense, otherwise they would not have developed the 88mm gun nor would have the deployed it so close to the front line troops. Rommel was able to repulse the British armour counterattacks at Arras, France in 1940 only with the 88mm anti-aircraft gun. This experience influenced him to utilize this weapon in a dual purpose anti-tank role in the desert. The British had attacked him in Arras with heavily armored Matilda tanks, armed with a 2-pound anti-tank gun, but no high explosive rounds against infantry. These cases are extremely relevant and important discussions into the interwar period.
Why did the British choose not to equip their tanks with HE rounds? Why didn't the Germans equip their Panzer MKIV and StugIII tanks with long barrel 75mm guns from the start? Why didn't the Russians equip their early T-34 tanks without universal radios (only the platoon leader had a radio)?
How was the Sherman tank developed and doctrinally planned to be utilized, a vehicle with an underpowered 75mm gun, prone to catching on fire, and a narrow track base not suited for cross country mobility (as described in the book Death Traps, ... Read More
Rated by buyers -
This book is a necessary for those who want to understand the relationship between development of technology and military innovation. It is not an easy book to read, but contains tremendous amount of information along with accurate historical records. Must for military tacticians and historians alike.
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